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also more volatile prices. In a period
of inflation, all prices do not increase
at the same rate. It becomes difficult
for businesspersons to know if they
can pass their cost increases on to
their customers. Businesspersons
respond by cutting back on invest-
ment. Investment, however, is
essential to long-run growth.
Mexico and Inertial Inflation
In recent years, Mexico has pur-
sued a stable monetary policy even
though the central bank has not
been independent. Inflation rates
have fallen drastically from the high
levels of the mid-1980s. But consid-
ering how rapidly Mexico put its
fiscal house in order, the fall in
inflation has been slow. This per-
sistence of inflation despite full
fiscal adjustment is a phenomenon
economists call inertial inflation.
One reason inflation may persist is
that when a central bank announces
it will hold down inflation, the
policy may lack credibility. If the
central bank is constitutionally sub-
servient to the treasury, businesses
and households may expect that
future increases in government
deficits will be financed through
the central bank—that is, financed
by printing money—despite the
frequency and vehemence of anti-
inflation statements by central
bankers. Accordingly, when busi-
nesses contract to buy goods and
services, some of them accept
sellers’ price increases, betting that
an inflationary surge will cause
overall price increases even greater
than what the buyer had contracted
to pay. In this case, if the central
bank tries to fight inflation by
tightening the monetary policy, the
ongoing increase in prices will cause
a severe recession. Mounting political
pressure on the central bank to
ease monetary policy may eventually
cause faster money growth. The
high inflation expectations thus
become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
The establishment of indepen-
dence for a central bank sends a
signal that surprise inflationary
I
n May, Mexican President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari proposed to his
congress a constitutional amend-
ment granting independence to the
nation’s central bank, Banco de
México. Although much of the media
took little notice of the proposal, it
represents a milestone in the trend
toward greater central bank inde-
pendence.1
The proposed amendment would
give Banco de México autonomy
in managing the nation’s money
supply and credit policy and require
staggered terms for members of the
bank’s governing body, so as to pre-
vent selection of a majority during
the term of any one Mexican president.
Central Bank Independence
and Long-Term Growth
Independence means that, as in
the cases of Germany’s Bundesbank
and the United States’ Federal
Reserve, a central bank does not
have to obey the government when
ordered to print money to pay for
federal deficits. Instead, an inde-
pendent central bank can follow a
noninflationary monetary policy
and leave the government to borrow
to pay its deficits rather than use
inflation to shrink the value the
nation’s money.
Independence also means that a
central bank can pay less attention
when politicians, including those in
the executive branch, call for expan-
sionary monetary policies to counter
cyclical downturns in the economy.
Politicians are sensitive to short-
term economic downturns because
such events can hurt their chances
for reelection (or their parties’).
Accordingly, to win elections, poli-
ticians sometimes try to pressure
their nation’s central bank to inflate
its way out of a downturn. They are
correct in guessing that the central
bank can do this.
Inflationary policies can some-
times spur higher output in the short
run. But when they do, they run the
risk of lowering long-run output.
The reason is, inflation typically
involves not only rising prices but
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money stock increases are less likely.
If the business community takes
this signal seriously, buyers will be
more reluctant to accept sellers’
efforts to push up prices. This time,
the self-fulfilling prophecy will help,
rather than hurt, the economy.
Numerous studies offer evidence
that central bank independence and
low inflation are closely linked.2
Across the board, the higher the
degree of independence enjoyed
by a country’s central bank, the
lower the country’s inflation.
Greater central bank indepen-
dence also has been linked to higher
real growth rates—probably because
inflation discourages investment
and stifles long-term growth. And
over the long run, monetary policies
that respond to political pressures
neither restrain the cyclical varia-
bility of output nor lead to lower
rates of unemployment.3
In sum, central bank indepen-
dence helps to place monetary
policy outside politics. Firms and
households become less likely to
act as if the government is trying to
trick them into believing inflation
will be low, and then print too much
money. An independent Banco de
México would help ensure the
longevity of the recent successful
economic liberalization and inflation
stabilization in that country. Its inde-
pendence enhances the credibility
of its commitment to stable inflation
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